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Abu Talhah al-Amrikee’s Response to My Response to Abu al-Qa’qa Mujahid

May 14, 2010 Debates, ENGLISH-LANGUAGE, Must Reads 6 comments

Here is the verbatim of Abu Talhah’s recent response to me. I present it unedited, without commercial interruption.  I’ll let my readers judge Abu Talhah’s points before I engage with a response.  JB

Bismillah ir-Raxmaan ir-Raxiim, alxamdulillahi Rabb il-Calameen, wa salaatu wa salaamu calaa Rasuulillah, wa ash-haadu an laa ilaaha illa Allah wa ash-haadu anna Muxammadan cabduhu wa rasuuluh,

Ammaa bacd,

It is truly sad that I have to write this, and I am the first to admit that in the past I fell for this to a degree as well, but Jarret Brachman, Michael Scheurer, Bill Roggio, and all of the people in the Counter Terrorism community are enemies of Allah who hate Islam and want to destroy the mujahidiin. This advise is not only directed at the sitters but it is also directed at the mujahidiin who seem to forget this from time to time.

This is the first time I am going to directly criticize our beloved mujahidiin, but this is a sincere advice in sha’a Allah, and this religion is sincerity as our Prophet, salaa Allahu calayhi wa salam, informed us.

This article is going to cover Jarret Brachman, because I simply know more about him than other CT officials, but there are similar proofs from the mouths of all of these people.

In a recent post on his blog Brachman wrote:

Jihadists, including yourself, still don’t understand what it is I actually do, so let me explain. I’m not trying to hunt you down or arrest you. There are other people who do that. I don’t have a boss that I give reports to about what I find on your internet sites, as you suggest. I’m a researcher.

In this statement Brachman begins with a truthful statement regarding what the average jihaadii believes he does. Most people do not understand it. Then he follows it with a statement designed to gain our trust, “I’m not trying to hunt you down or arrest you.” This is true, he is not actively engaged in either of these things. Then he mentions that other people are responsible for that. This is something he says in order to gain more trust, by making himself out to be a potential ally who is acting for the enemy. No, he does not hunt us down. However, his research is designed to make it easier for the people who do actually do that to hunt us down and make us surrender. In the next two statements he tries to get us to dialogue with him by showing that he is interested in understanding us, not in killing us.

Jarret Brachman is not our ally as he says below:

The irony of this conversation is that I have spent my career trying to understand your ideology, your goals and your senior leadership. I think I have a fairly accurate picture of you and I actually find some of your points to be sound. Far from your worst enemy I might actually one of your most important potential allies in this fight. I am open to dialog. I am eager to reduce the violence on both sides. But we need to start being honest with one another about what this fight is about. Yes you have grievances that likely will never be redressed. The question is whether or not you want to make the world a better or worse place for the next generation.”

This is more or less a lie told to gain out trust. He may actually believe some of our “grievances” are valid, but he does not care about this. He knows that America attacked the Muslims first. He knows why 9/11 happened. He knows that America killed millions of Muslims before they were attacked. However, he does not care about any of it. If he cared about any of this, then he would be writing articles refuting the fact that America was attacked because of their “way of life” (and if he is reading this then he will probably do that just to say, “I do care about you guys,” so he can keep getting valuable dialogue with the Muslims).

The truth of the matter is that there are many sides to any modern war. One of these sides is focused on propaganda and how to convince your enemy that their position is futile. This is the side he is fighting on.

Jarret Brachman is no different than the 19 year old marine who shoots Muslim women and children in Iraq or Afghanistan. His job is not necessarily to pull the trigger, but he is supposed to make that marines job easier by reducing the chance that someone else will kill him, and by reducing the outrage in the media when this happens. He likely views this action as counterproductive and ill-advised, but he only views it like this from a strategic perspective. He would think that a marine shooting up a house makes it harder on other marines who want to shoot other Muslims in situations that are easier for someone to swallow when they read about it in the newspaper.

Brachman makes his intentions clear in another article:

“My approach since 2006 has been to let my adversary guide me. I let them tell me where they believe they are strongest, most vulernable and importantly, where the fractures are within their movement that can be exacerbated through wedge issues. They are the true experts on themselves and, when they talk, they serve the role of a compass for us. Even better is that they can’t help themselves from talking.”

Many of us in the community of sitters try to argue with CT experts and sometimes people even outright say: “Mr. Brachman you are not going to be able to succeed here, because of this and that.”

Why would you say this!? This is retarded! If you say this type of thing, then someone should break your hands and cut out your tongue so that you do not have any way of communicating with these people. Alxamdulillah most of the people who do this are not very involved in the jihaadii movement and usually they give useless advice. It is surprising to see this, but this is actually an area where some of our mujahidiin, even from the leadership, make major mistakes. I will not mention specifics, because if I did that, then I would be no different than the ones I am referring to here.

Advising CT experts on where they are correct and incorrect is stupid, unless it is an area where there is mutual benefit. For example, explaining to someone that when America kills Muslims, then Muslims will kill Americans is beneficial knowledge for both. CT experts know this, so there is no need to go too into depth on the issue, but reminding them from time to time can be beneficial. This is like how Shaykh Usama cited Michael Scheurer to explain to the American people why 9/11 happened. Scheurer is not an ally, and his job was to help kill Shaykh Usama, but nevertheless this was an area of mutual benefit.

Brachman tries to refute this claim to a degree:

“First, Abu Talhah accords too much influence to CT speicalists on U.S. policy. If he thinks that by helping to create separate camps between academics he can have some influence over U.S. policy, he’s kidding himself. I’ve been yapping for years and I’m still not sure what direct influence over policy I’ve actually had.”

This is an important point, because we need to understand that Congress and the President do not care about CT analysts when they make policy. They care about what the American people think. I do not think there is a single CT expert who thinks that America was attacked because of its way of life. However, the American people believe this, so Congress and Obama will echo this even though none of their advisers tell them this.

However, CT analysts do have an effect on the American public when their articles make it into the mainstream media and when they are interviewed on television. Michael Scheurer has done a good job in convincing some American people of this and Shaykh Usama bin Ladin has exploited this by praising him which encourages him to continue on the same path. Often jihaadiis, both from the sitters and the mujahidiin, like to see themselves praised by CT officials. CT officials also like to see us praise them. We should ignore the praise given to us, and we should exploit this tool against them. When a CT official praises you, then he either agrees with you which is unlikely, or he is trying to exploit you in some way which is more likely.

We should read the works of people who are influential in the policy sphere, but we should never bother dialoguing with them at all, even in areas of mutual benefit. These people have no effect on America’s understanding of the current war. However, CT officials who appear on television do have an effect on this, and they can be used. However, we should treat them like bombs. A bomb can help you if you use it correctly, or it can kill you if you use it wrong or somebody else is using it. They are tools and they should not be viewed as people. Rather every interaction with them should be viewed in terms of cost and benefit.

The above is from an article directed at me, where he then tries to encourage further dialogue by stating:

“His line of thought (focusing on deception, redirection, jujitsu, etc..) reminds me writers like Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir and Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah on the tactical side and Abu Musab al-Suri (role of publishing, studying the enemy, education, intellectual empowerment of the jihadist movement) on the strategic side.”

I highly doubt that Brachman actually agrees with this statement, and it is either made in a condescending manner, or it is designed to encourage further dialogue. Brachman was likely looking for me to refute his refutation when he published this piece. This piece served two purposes: name recognition and encouraging further dialogue. In fact the title of the piece was,“Engaging Jihadists Head On: My Response To Abu Talhah Al-Amrikee.” Even the title of this piece was directed at getting further dialogue.

This article could be viewed as further dialogue, but sometimes one has to weigh the pros and cons of advising the Muslims and inadvertently advising the kuffar. Even writing a comment at the bottom of one of Brachman’s articles saying, “You are stupid may Allah kill you,” or something like this is valuable feedback for him. It lets him know that this bothered some jihaadii, and that he should keep doing it. He will then tell the person that this is what he is doing, and that person will respond with some more in depth explaining why they were not actually bothered by what Brachman wrote. Brachman will then gain more insight into how this person thinks and will either comment further to learn more, or he will not comment any further, because he does not find it beneficial to dialogue more.

In the following quote Brachman praises a Madkhalii who naturally would rather be praised by a kafir than a Muslim:

“Thank you Sunnah Publishing for writing your piece and challenging me. This is exactly what needs to be done by Muslims in the U.S. and this is exactly what I’ve been advocating needs to happen. Muslims in this country need to stand up when they hear a characterization that they disagree with and correct it in a way that fosters dialog, not mudslinging. I’m delighted to serve as the vehicle by which this occurs. I’m not wedded to my live on-air comments that SP has taken issue with and I am happy to see mainstream Salafists fighting back and rejecting any attachment to al-Awlaki. SP, let me take a closer look at your argument and if I agree, I’ll go ahead and post a public correction. But again, let me thank you for engaging me in a respectful, direct and public way. More soon on this – but rest assured, I’ve heard your concern and agree with the basis of your argument. Distinctions are everything in this fight.”

In this quote Brachman promotes a deviant sect by praising them and rewarding them for helping him “in this fight.” Madkhaliis are effectively responsible for the destruction of the Salafii dacwa in America, because their sect is so detestable to the majority of people. Normally a sect operates on making itself more appealing to the masses. However, Madkhaliis operate by insulting everyone that does not agree with them, and this hurts Islam tremendously. However, Brachman has been a longtime proponent of Madkhalism, because of its negative impact on the Muslims. Brachman will claim that this is not why he supports them, but this is a lie, and it all goes back to his approach of trying to disguise himself as an ally of the Muslims in order to harm them more.

Brachman has written extensively on the topic of promoting deviant sects as a way to win the “War on Terror.”

His current tactic of baiting jihaadiis to find out what works with them and what does not work is one he talks about publicly, yet we seem to keep falling for it.

Tim Stevens said this:

“Aaron [Weisenburg] describes Jarret’s current strategy of baiting online jihadis as ‘the curious art of poking homicidal freaks with a sharp stick’, and this pretty well sums up his approach, which frequently deploys humour and ridicule as a means of calling out some of the patently ludicrous antics of our internet friends.“

These people hate us. They want us to either change or to die. They are no different than the Communists in China who put you through a re-education camp if you disagree with them. If you fail then they kill you. Brachman even advocates this approach several times on his blog and in his writing. He thinks Naziesque re-education camps are a good tool for the kuffar to use against the Muslims.

Brachman might sound like he is interested in hearing what one has to say, but it is not for the sake of trying to help us. Rather, he has an innate intellectual curiosity coupled with the desire to harm us and those who think like us.

Brachman is a kafir, and the kuffar should not be taken as friends. Al-wala wal-bara is something that the kuffar cannot deal with. Brachman even tries to get Muslims to abandon this concept in a number of places, because he recognizes the danger it poses to them. Do not make attach yourself Brachman or any other kafir. Disavow them. They are your enemies and they should be treated as such. A combatant (i.e. the one whose blood is halal) in Islam is not limited to the one with the gun. It also includes those who devise the strategies of the war. Who is usually sought after more in combat? The lowly infantry man, or the general and his advisers?

No kafir CT analyst should be trusted. They will write articles telling you everything I mentioned above is incorrect and that they really do want to help you, but they are liars and they will even mention this in other articles. How are we so gullible that we fall for tricks that our enemy admits are tricks before he tries them on us? This is nonsense and we should not be like this.

(By the way, if you mention a CT analyst’s name in something, then I guarantee you they will read it, wa Allahu calam. Therefore we should either avoid this, or we should make sure it is necessary. Their entire careers are built around building up their names, so naturally the one’s who are the most famous are the one’s who like seeing their names the most)

Engaging Jihadists Head-On: My Response to Abu Talhah al-Amrikee

April 23, 2010 Brachman's Take, Debates, ENGLISH-LANGUAGE, JIHOBBYISM, Uncategorized 6 comments

Abu Talhah al-Amrikee, avowed South Park critic,  American hardline jihadi-Salafi, who admins “The Mujahid Blog,” contributes to  ”Revolution Muslim” and a reader/interlocutor of this blog recently published a piece to his website entitled, “Fomenting Disunity  in the Counterterrorism Movement.” It’s part of his series on “Counter Counterterrorism” where he tries to help the jihadist movement to sidestep the damage caused by the academic work of CT researchers and, in fact, turn our work back against us. By doing this, he believes jihadists can actually degrade and divide the counterterrorism  movement as we try to degrade and divide them.  So, I guess this piece could be entitled, “Countering Counter-Counterterrorists” (Paging post-modernism).

I can appreciate the overall thrust of Abu Talhah’s approach (seeking to divide and conquer) as it’s one that I’ve embraced in my own writings and thinking about how degrade al-Qaida movements.  For those who don’t have the time to read my whole post, here’s the bottom-line-up-front: although Abu Talhah really tries to advance jihadist counterstrategic thinking, he mirror-images to a point where he makes his argument irrelevant.  In a nutshell, he thinks that turning CT researchers against each other is bad for us, good for them – just like he would view us turning jihadi ideologues against one another. The difference is that, whereas in their world this is called fitna and leads to all sorts of in-fighting, for us, this is called academic debate – even democracy.  Our system is predicated on in-fighting (Madison anyone), which is why it works. Jihadis don’t seem to fully capture that, which is why Abu Talhah, a smart guy, advances a strategy that’s flawed from the start.

The approach that he uses in his counter-counterterrorism series was actually the conceptual backbone of the “Stealing AQ’s Playbook,” article that I co-authored in 2006, which has been cited now several times by Ayman al-Zawahiri specifically because of how it turns his own words against him.

I have since sought to refine and advance this methodology because when it comes to counterterrorism, the devil is in the details.  Curiously, al-Qaida has also been honing this methodology, most provocatively in The Power of Truth and most recently in The West and the Dark Tunnel.

My approach since 2006 has been to let my adversary guide me.  I let them tell me where they believe they are strongest, most vulernable and importantly, where the fractures are within their movement that can be exacerbated through wedge issues. They are the true experts on themselves and, when they talk, they serve the role of a compass for us. Even better is that they can’t help themselves from talking.

Abu Talhah’s approach in this article employs a similarly-styled methodology (he’s not the first), in that he’s seeking to apply it to counterterrorism researchers, not jihadist ideologues.  In other words, he flips the approach that I use against jihadis on its head, turning it back on me, or at least trying to.

I have to applaud him for his ambition.  I mean, on paper, it all seems to make sense, right?.  CT researchers embody many of the same qualities of the jihadist types who I study.  We (CT researchers) are obsessive, mission-oriented, detail-centric and, at least among the public researchers, talkative.  We are all vying for attention, support and influence over constituencies. Abu Talhah, in recognizing the structural and personality similarities between the two communities, structures an argument based on the following points, and these are his quotes:

I have noticed that there are many polarizing figures and ideas in the movement that can be exploited to create divisions.

by identifying areas of difference or strange theories we can exploit them and divide the movement in sha’a Allah.

Simply put, they are better at analyzing us than we are at analyzing them. They do it full time, but we spend a large amount of our time learning other things and only spend a little time of CT officials.

So,  I agree with Abu Talhah’s observation that, like the jihadist movement, our field has several polarizing personalities and positions. Our most vocal and provocative ‘experts’, can be leveraged against us, he argues, if done right.

Not anyone can do this, however, Abu Talhah argues.  In fact, he says, “I do not think the average person can dialogue (sic) with [counterterrorism researchers] enough to significantly gain their trust and mislead them without making a fool out of his or herself.” Now, since Abu Talhah and I have been holding an ongoing dialog, I’m guessing it’s because he doesnt consider himself an “average person” (he’s a “jihadilitist” – hah).  Rather, he believes that he is smarter than the average jihadi in that he’s better equipped to hold that conversation with me (and I guess mislead me, although I don’t get that feeling from our back-and-forth, but that’s probably b/c he’s so good at misleading me).  His article, he explains, “is the first work in English dealing with this subject which goes to show how far behind [the jihadist movement]” is.

Now let’s get to the fun part.  Abu Talhah profiles three CT researchers as a proof-of-concept for his use of this divide-and-conquer methodology.  He says that he “will attempt to show how one can exploit some of the opinions of three leading CT experts: Jarret Brachman, Evan Kohlmann, and J.M. Berger.” I’ll limit my comments to his comments about me.

Before highlighting my exploitable vulnerabilities, Abu Talhah briefly takes on “right wing bloggers,” who he says make, “overzealous attempts” to criticize CT officials even though these bloggers “are average people” who are “half as intelligent or less than your typical CT expert.”  He thinks that their comments “can be capitalized on because sometimes what these loons say actually makes it into newspapers and articles from respected institutions.”  Again, I agree with his comments about how dangerous some of those alarmist provocateurs in my field looking for media exposure and funding can be for American CT efforts.  For some reason, though, they still get invited to the party, despite how little they actually know and how much harder harder they make my job of convincing people that nuance and granularity are more important than blustery over-generalizations.

He then directs his attention at me. Here’s his comments:

Jarret Brachman is viewed in very high regard by others in his field. However, from what I have seen he can be exploited in three different areas:

Jihobbyism: Often other CT officials express concern over the term “Jihobbyist” which was coined by Brachman. It refers to people who post things on the internet, but who have not done anything concrete as far as action is concerned. For example, I would certainly have this phrase directed at me by Brachman and his associates.

Many people in the CT field are worried that this term causes people to underestimate the threat of domestic attacks. References to this word in postings when a domestic attack does occur could cause people to blame Jarret Brachman for any shortfalls in attention being payed to domestic threats. It does not matter if Brachman has clarified his stance toward “Jihobbyism,” because the damage has been done already and it is clear who popularized this term. We should use this term in our public postings for two reasons:

  1. It draws a clear distinction between real mujahideen and people like me, which creates a feeling of inadequacy, and feelings of inadequacy drive people to eliminate that feeling through actions.
  2. It turns any blogger who does anything remotely close to action into a failure by Brachman, and even if people are reading this post right now, then they will not be able to stop their feelings of Brachman’s failure in this matter from coming to light. Even if Brachman’s opinions have a positive result for the CT movement, it will be destroyed by the emphasis on this word by members of the jihadi community.

On “jihobbyism,” Abu Talhah is quite pleased with me for developing this term.  He alludes to Aaron Weisburd’s arguments (that the term, “jihobbyism,” creates a false dichotomy between thought and action), which is actually a good thing for jihadists, he argues.  Although I have clarified what I mean by the term and wrote a whole article explaining how AQ’s entire goal is to transform jihobbyists into operators, he suggests that the damage has already been done.

In other words, he’s embracing my term jihobbyists b/c he thinks that it makes the CT community think less, not more, of people like him and his RM buddies.  When the jihadists embrace the term, they are basically lowering our own expectations of their capabilities, which he believes then allow them to take us by surprise.  I actually argue the opposite, that it helps provide us with more tools for make critical distinctions.

His line of thought (focusing on deception, redirection, jujitsu, etc..) reminds me writers like Abd al-Rahman al-Faqir and Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah on the tactical side and Abu Musab al-Suri (role of publishing, studying the enemy, education, intellectual empowerment of the jihadist movement) on the strategic side.

Next, Abu Talha tries to show how I’m vulnerable on my research about the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). He says:

The LIFG: Brachman is currently working on a bunch of stuff about the LIFG, which is not related to the greater jihadi movement. This is sort of how CNN tried to promote the fatwa of Tahir ul-Qadri when he has no influence on the jihadi movement.

We will have to wait until he publishes some things before we see exactly how to attack it, but by pretending that there is a group of CT officials who are obsessed with the LIFG we could likely convince someone to produce a paper refuting this LIFG-CT group after a couple of years. This would help divide the movement into camps.

I think Abu Talha is weakest on this argument.  What I see is mirror-imaging of the jihadi-Salafi world. First, Abu Talhah accords too much influence to CT speicalists on U.S. policy. If he thinks that by helping to create separate camps between academics he can have some influence over U.S. policy, he’s kidding himself.  I’ve been yapping for years and I’m still not sure what direct influence over policy I’ve actually had.

Although there might be some general similarities between jihadist ideologues and public CT intellectuals, getting some CT scholars to debate me about whether or not lessons can be learned from the LIFG experience would not produce his intended effect.  As opposed to the jihadist approach, which views competition among ideologues as zero-sum in nature, our field views competitive analysis as useful, if not desirable.  We embrace the dialectic (this all goes back to my argument about the epistemological differences between those wedded to hardline Salafism versus those more in the Cartestian/Lockean/Empiricist tradition).

Finally, Abu Talhah tries to show how my interest in Abu Yahya al-Libi can be turned against me. He says:

Abu Yahya Al-Libi: Brachman has an unusual obsession with Abu Yahya Al-Libi, hafidhuhullah, and this can be exploited as a fringe opinion which could eventually divide the CT field into two camps. One camp thinking he is the next Shaykh Usama, and the other thinking he is insignificant. If this was to occur, then Al-Qa’ida would likely begin releasing videos which clearly played him up to be a major leader, and then keep him out of the spotlight for a while. This would divide CT officials, because there would  be two sets of evidence which contradict each other. Naturally the movement would fall into two camps overtime.

Again, clever in its ambition but just totally backwards. Our field is predicated on debate. We believe it is this form of competition that helps us get the story right. Whereas you see in-fighting as “fitna,” we don’t. In-fighting makes us better – it brings us closer to the truth – it’s at the heart of why democracy works (insert your comments about tawhid here) .  I know embracing in-fighting might seem like a counterintuitive argument for someone who adheres to an absolutist epistemology, where one scholar’s success means another one’s failure, but it’s why our ideology is enduring and yours is not.

Ok, I’ll stop here for now but look forward to continuing the interchange.

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